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#2A-6/2/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-8759 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
RICHARD F. MULLANEY. CITY ATTORNEY, for Respondent 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE. GENERAL COUNSEL. CSEA LEGAL 
DEPARTMENT, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Saratoga Springs (City) to the decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Public Employees Fair Employment Act (Act) when its 
negotiators failed to affirmatively seek ratification of an 
agreement reached by the parties' negotiators. The ALJ 
concluded that such failure resulted in a waiver by the City 
of any right to ratify the agreement made with the charging 
party. Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.. Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
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The charge alleged, and the City's answer admitted, that 
on April 30, 1986, the chief negotiators of the City and CSEA 
had signed a memorandum of agreement, which was subject to 
ratification by the membership of CSEA and the City Council. 
The charge alleged and the evidence of record establishes 
that the City Council met on May 5, 1986, discussed the 
agreement in executive session and then left the executive 
session and voted three to two in favor of a motion that the 
City Council "accept the contract as discussed except the 
hours will have to be renegotiated to 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 
P.M." CSEA alleged and the evidence of record establishes 
that it was notified of the Council's action and that its 
membership thereafter ratified, on May 13, 1986. the 
memorandum of agreement, modified to contain what it 
understood to be the change called for by the City Council's 
motion of approval. The City thereafter refused to execute a 
written agreement incorporating what CSEA alleged to be a 
mutually ratified memorandum of agreement. 
In its answer, the City admitted that the City Council 
passed a motion to accept conditionally the memorandum of 
agreement but denied that the approval was conditioned on 
only one modification. The City asserted that the City 
Council's approval was conditioned on certain other 
modifications which CSEA has not accepted and refused to 
negotiate. 
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CSEA contends that the dispute in this case related only 
to the identification of the condition imposed in the City's 
ratified motion. CSEA maintains that it relied on actions of 
the City's negotiators in identifying that condition and that 
the evidence establishes that its membership ratified the 
agreement as modified by the City Council. 
The ALJ. however, did not find it necessary to deal with 
the nature of the modification by the City Council in 
deciding the case. Rather, the ALJ found that the record 
evidence established that the City's negotiators failed in 
their affirmative duty to present the agreement to the City 
Council and to support its approval. Consequently, the ALJ 
ordered the City to execute, upon request, an agreement 
embodying the agreement reached by the negotiators on April 
30, 1986. as modified by the agreements reached thereafter. 
In its exceptions, the City does not challenge the 
factual findings of- the ALJ. Its arguments are directed 
solely to the recommended order of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The ALJ has accurately summarized the record evidence. 
That evidence establishes that the memorandum of agreement 
was presented to the City Council on May 5, 1986, by Butler, 
a City Commissioner and City Council member and a member of 
the City's negotiating team. Discussion at the City Council 
meeting centered on the following provision in the memorandum 
of agreement: 
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City Hall offices shall remain open to the 
public between the hours of 8:30 AM to 4:30 PM 
Monday through Friday. 
Within such office hours, employees shall 
work thirty-three (33) hours per week as 
follows: 
One day per week - employees work 8:30 AM -
4 :-30^  EM 41 hour lunch) 
Four (4) days per week - employees work 8:30 AM 
- 4:00 PM or 9:00 AM - 4:30 PM (1 hour lunch). 
The actual scheduling for office coverage 
during business hours shall be developed by the 
department head within each respective 
department. Employees may volunteer for 
specific tours within the schedule, but final 
determination regarding staff coverage shall be 
made by the department head. 
The Agreement herein to abandon the regular 
Saturday workday is not intended to prohibit 
the City from assigning additional worktime on 
an exceptional basis beyond the regular 
scheduled work week. 
Under the prior agreement between the parties the City 
Hall was open 9:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. on weekdays and 
9:00 A.M. to noon on Saturdays, except in July and August 
when there were no Saturday hours. Employees at City Hall 
had a workweek of 33 hours with each employee's schedule 
corresponding to the City Hall's hours of business. At the 
May 5 City Council meeting, concern was expressed regarding 
the loss of Saturday hours, the nature of a 33-hour workweek 
within a 35-hour per week City Hall schedule, and changing 
the hour at which City Hall had historically opened. In the 
open session. Butler then made the motion that was approved 
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by the City Council. Much of the dispute thereafter centered 
on the meaning of the City Council's action. At the City 
Council's next meeting, on May 19, Butler notified the 
Council that an actual vote on the question of the parties' 
agreement would not be taken since "There are a few items 
. . . that need to be discussed." Instead, he suggested that 
the Council vote on the abolition of Saturday hours alone so 
that such abolition could immediately go into effect. A vote 
of three to two against such motion then occurred, with Mayor 
Jones and Butler casting the two affirmative votes. 
There is no record evidence that at the May 5 meeting, 
Butler said a word in support of the agreement's provisions 
despite the opposition of the other Council members to the 
agreement's work hours and workweek. Butler merely presented 
the agreement, in its written form and through his oral 
presentation of its provisions, to the Council for their 
perusal and vote. Following this discussion, Butler did not 
make a motion for ratification of the agreement but for its 
modification. His action at the May 19 Council meeting 
evidences that he did not consider the May 5 motion as 
seeking ratification of an agreement, as he noted on May 19 
that the agreement was not yet ready to be voted upon. There 
is no evidence that Kelly, the chief negotiator for the City, 
was present at either meeting nor is there evidence that 
1G960 
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Kelly had any communication with the Council concerning the 
agreement during the at-issue time period. The record 
evidence of his silence in the face of the Council's 
discussions and concerns is unexplained. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The City objects to an order that requires it to execute 
a document embodying the agreement reached by the parties. 
The City claims that such an order forces a legislative body 
to perform a legislative act. It contends that we cannot 
require a legislative body to approve an agreement. The City 
also argues that such an order confers on CSEA a "right of 
mandatory review". We construe this argument to mean that 
CSEA would be given the right to have this Board determine 
what should be agreed to. As previously noted, the City does 
not challenge the ultimate finding that Butler failed to 
support the agreement and seek its ratification and that this 
violated the City's obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
DISCUSSION 
By its exceptions, the City indicates a misunderstanding 
of the respective legal responsibilities of the chief 
executive officer and the legislative body of a public 
employer regarding negotiations under the Taylor Law. The 
Act contemplates that negotiations will be an executive, not 
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a legislative process.- The Act specifically defines an 
agreement as an exchange of mutual promises between the chief 
executive officer and an employee organization "which becomes 
a binding contract" except as to any provisions which require 
approval by the legislative body (§§201.12. 204-a). 
2/ 
We have previously pointed out- that there is an 
important difference between the legislative body's statutory 
responsibility to review an executed agreement and the power 
to "ratify" the entire agreement prior to execution. A 
legislative body may not unilaterally reserve to itself the 
3/ 
authority to ratify the entire agreement.— On the other 
hand, the parties may agree that their negotiations will be 
subject to the right of the legislative body to ratify the 
4/ 
entire agreement.- Where the legislative body directly 
assumes responsibilities in the negotiation process with the 
acquiescence of the chief executive officer and the employee 
organization, the members of the legislative body that 
negotiated the agreement may not repudiate it by 
^
/§§201.12. 204-a; City of Kingston v. PERB. 16 PERB 
17002 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1983). See CSEA v. Helsbv. 21 
N.Y.2d 541, 547. 1 PERB ir702. at p. 7008 (1968). 
2/Town of Dresden. 17 PERB 1P096 (1984). 
3/ralconer CSD. 6 PERB 1P029 (1973): Jamestown 
Teachers Ass'n. 6 PERB 1f3075 (1973). 
4/den Cove City School District. 6 PERB 1f3004 (1973) 
10962 
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5/ 
claiming a different capacity as legislators.- Thus, the 
right to "ratify" is entirely based upon the parties' 
agreement while the right of legislative approval inheres in 
the legislative body by virtue of the statute. 
Where the parties have contemplated ratification of the 
agreement, the negotiators for each side have an affirmative 
duty to present the agreement to their ratifying entity and 
to support its approval.- Failure in that duty results in 
a loss by the party of any right to ratify. Where a party's 
conduct constitutes a loss of the right of ratification, it 
is appropriate to require the respondent to execute the 
agreement that is found to have been accepted by the 
7/ 
negotiators for both parties.- This completes the 
executive's role in the negotiating process. An order 
directing such execution does not foreclose the legislative 
body from the exercise of its proper legislative function 
insofar as it relates to those matters requiring, by statute, 
legislative approval before they may be binding upon the 
employer.-
5/Sylvan-Verona Beach CSD. 15 PERB ir3067 (1982). 
bunion Springs Central School Teachers Ass'n, 6 PERB 
1P074 (1973); City of Rochester, 7 PERB ir3060; 
Sylvan-Verona Beach CSD, supra. 
UUnion Springs Central School Teachers Ass'n, supra. 
^Town of Dresden, supra. 
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This brings us to the events of May 5, 1986. The 
conduct of the City Council on that date either constituted 
executive action--i.e. a ratification vote—or legislative 
action. . If the former, the failure of Butler to support the 
agreement affirmatively constitutes a violation of the City's 
duty to negotiate in good faith. This was the determination 
of the ALJ. whose consequent conclusions of law are all 
proper applications of our decisions in relevant cases. If, 
however, the conduct of the City Council on May 5 constituted 
legislative action, as is claimed by the City, the meeting 
would have to be considered as one at which the City chose 
not to submit the agreement for ratification, since 
ratification is not properly a legislative act. Such failure 
to present the agreement for ratification would have the same 
effect as Butler's failure to support the agreement. In 
either view of the City Council's meeting, the City lost the 
right to reject the agreement through the ratification 
process. 
Accordingly, the City's exceptions are rejected, the 
decision of the ALJ is affirmed and we find that the City 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when its negotiator failed to 
perform its duty of affirmatively seeking ratification of the 
agreement reached by the parties' negotiators and that such 
failure results in a loss by the City of any right to 
ratify. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the City of Saratoga 
Springs: 
.1. Execute, upon the request of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO, a collective 
bargaining agreement, effective January 1. 
1986 to December 31, 1987. embodying the 
agreement reached by the parties on April 30, 
1986 as modified by the agreements reached 
thereafter as found by the ALJ; 
2. Negotiate in good faith under the Act with 
the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME, AFL-CIO; and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all 
locations used by it for written 
communications to members of the bargaining 
unit represented by the Civil Service 
Employees Association. Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
DATED: June 2. 1987 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairma'n 
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APPENDIX 
I I ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENTREJ^ONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees of the City of Saratoga Springs in 
the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association. 
Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the City of Saratoga 
Springs will: 
1. execute, upon the request of the Civil 
Service Employees Association. Inc., Local 
1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. a collective 
bargaining agreement effective January 1. 
1986 to December 31, 1987 embodying the 
agreement reached by the parties; 
2. negotiate in good faith under the Act with 
the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
City of Saratoga Springs 
Dated.... By...... (R«pr*Mntativt) (Tltto) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. XJ. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JACOB K. JAVITS CONVENTION CENTER OF 
NEW YORK and/or OGDEN ALLIED 
FACILITY MAINTENANCE CORPORATION, 
~-•--"•- Respondent* 
-and- CASE NO. U-873 2 
LOCAL 32B-32J. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
INTERNATIONAL UNION. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
PROSKAUER ROSE GOETZ & MENDELSOHN (SAUL G. KRAMER. ESQ. 
and ANDREW P. MARKS, ESQ.. of Counsel) for Convention 
Center Operating Corporation 
MANNING. RAAB. DEALY & STURM (IRA A. STURM. ESQ.. 
of Counsel) for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 
32B-32J, Service Employees International Union. AFL-CIO 
(SEIU) to the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its improper practice charge on jurisdictional 
grounds. 
The charge, filed on May 12. 1986, named as respondent 
"Jacob J.[sic] Javits Convention Center of New York and/or 
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Ogden Allied Facility Maintenance Corporation."- The 
allegations in the charge twice refer to these entities as 
"joint employers". Mindful that this Board does not have 
jurisdiction over a joint employer consisting of a public 
employer and a private employer, the Director and ALJ sought 
clarification from the SEIU as to the public employer status 
of the named respondents. 
SEIU delayed its response until September 5 when it 
stated that it was willing to amend the charge to reflect 
that the sole employing entity of the employees concerned is 
the Convention Center Operating Corporation (Convention 
Center), a public employer. Nevertheless, it thereafter 
submitted additional information to the ALJ in support of its 
position that the employees in question are employed by both 
the Convention Center and Ogden Allied Facility Maintenance 
Corporation (Ogden) as joint employers. Finally, however, on 
October 30, SEIU stated that it wished to withdraw the joint 
employer allegation and to proceed with the Convention Center 
as the sole employer. 
i^The Convention Center Operating Corporation 
appeared and answered the charge. Apparently, the name in 
the title of the charge is mistaken. The Convention Center 
Operating Corporation is a public benefit corporation. It 
is undisputed that Ogden Allied Facility Maintenance 
Corporation is a private corporation. 
«>«€ .<>, 
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In his decision, the ALJ determined that SEIU 
originally intended to charge a joint public-private 
employer, an entity which is not a public employer under the 
Taylor Law. He concluded that SEIU's request in September 
to amend the charge to name only the Convention Center - a 
public employer - as the respondent, came too late. In his 
view, since the Convention Center is a separate legal entity 
from the joint employer comprising the Convention Center and 
Ogden, SEIU's attempted amendment constitutes the naming of 
a new respondent, which cannot be permitted more than four 
months after the complained of conduct. Having denied the 
amendment, the ALJ determined that the charge is directed 
against an alleged joint employer, one part of which is a 
private entity, and that, therefore, the charge must be 
dismissed. 
In its exceptions, SEIU argues that a legitimate 
question existed and continues to exist as to the employing 
entity of the employees involved in this dispute. It 
asserts that its charge was intended to allege alternative 
theories with regard to the status of the employer and that 
such alternative allegations should be permitted since SEIU 
is not in possession of the facts. In SEIU's view, its 
charge alleges three "scenarios": (1) the Convention Center 
as employer. (2) Ogden as employer and (3) both 
constituting a joint employer. It seeks a hearing at which 
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all the evidence of the employment relationship could be 
produced and, upon which evidence, the Board could determine 
the identity of the employer. 
SEIU argues that its amendment withdrawing "scenarios" 
(2) and (3) should be permitted since "scenario" (1) was 
always incorporated in its charge. Furthermore, it urges 
that its amendment should not be barred by our four-month 
statute of limitation since it does not name a new 
respondent but one that is apprised of the allegations 
against it and will not be prejudiced by the amendment. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The allegations of the charge explicitly refer to the 
Convention Center and Ogden as "joint employers". The only 
source of ambiguity in the charge is the use of "and/or" in 
the description of the respondents. Inasmuch as a charge 
against a joint public-private employer cannot be 
2/ 
entertained by us.— the Director and the ALJ sought 
"clarification" of the phrase "and/or". They repeatedly 
requested SEIU to advise whether it was charging a joint 
public-private employer. 
We conclude that SEIU intended to, and did, file a 
charge with us against a joint employer consisting of a 
^/Matter of New York Public Library v. PERB. 
45 A.D. 2d 271, 7 PERB 1[7013 (1st Dep' t 1974). aff'd. 37 
N.Y.2d 752, 8 PERB 1F7013 (1975). 
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public employer and a private employer. It is clear that 
SEIU's position from the time of the filing of the charge 
has been that the Convention Center and Ogden are joint 
employers. Indeed, a major purpose of the charge was to 
obtain a determination by us of such joint employer status. 
For its own reasons, evident in the materials submitted thus 
far in this proceeding, SEIU believed that it was in its 
interest to connect Ogden to the employees working at the 
Jacob K. Javits Convention Center. SEIU was therefore 
reluctant to limit its charge to the sole public employer 
involved, the Convention Center. 
Whatever weight the Director and ALJ may have given to 
"and/or", the phrase cannot support the construction that 
SEIU urges, i.e., that it has charged three separate legal 
entities thereby. Its conduct throughout the proceeding 
establishes that it believes, and has alleged, Ogden to be 
the employer or part of a joint employer. SEIU's conduct 
further indicates that it has sought such a determination 
from this Board, even though this would require a dismissal 
of the charge on the ground that the employment in question 
is in the private sector. The Director and the ALJ 
correctly refused to process the charge on the ground that 
it did not allege facts which, as a matter of law, might 
constitute a violation of the Taylor Law. 
^10971 
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SEIU's request to "amend" its charge must be viewed, 
therefore, as a request to change the party respondent. The 
Convention Center is a different legal entity from the joint 
employer entity originally named as respondent. This change 
constitutes a change of substance, not simply an amendment 
to the title of the action. The attempt now to name the 
Convention Center as sole respondent is untimely. 
Accordingly, SEIU's request to amend its charge must be 
rejected and. since the charge is directed against an 
alleged joint employer, one part of which is a private 
entity, the charge must be dismissed. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: June 2. 1987 
Albany, New York 
"10972 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNIONDALE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-and. CASE_NO. C-3005 
UNIONDALE SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
UNIONDALE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
RAINS & POGREBIN. P.C. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL. ESQ.. and 
) SHERYL TEITEL WINKLER. ESQ.. of Counsel) for Employer 
JOSEPH M. McPARTLIN. Field Representative. NYSUT. for 
Petitioner 
LOUIS N. ORFAN. ESQ.. for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Uniondale Supervisors Association (USA) and the Uniondale 
Union Free School District (District) to the decision of the 
Director dismissing the petition of the USA which sought to 
decertify the Uniondale Teachers Association (UTA) and 
certify the USA as bargaining agent for 17 department 
"10973 
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chairpersons employed by the District. The department 
chairpersons are included in a bargaining unit of all 
certified personnel in the District, numbering approximately 
400. The District supported the petition while the UTA 
opposed it. 
The USA and the District based their case for 
decertification on three factors: 1) the level of 
supervisory functions performed by the department 
chairpersons; 2) alleged subversion of their supervisory 
responsibilities because of their placement in the teacher 
bargaining unit; and 3) inadequate representation of the 
department chairpersons by the UTA. 
The Director found that the evidence did not establish 
that: l) the level of supervisory functions performed by 
the department chairpersons was high enough to warrant their 
removal from the UTA unit of which they had been a part 
since 1968; 2) the incidents of alleged subversion of 
supervisory responsibility were of the level or degree 
warranting the removal from the unit; and 3) the UTA had 
failed to adequately represent the interests of the 
department chairpersons. 
In their exceptions, the USA and the District challenge 
each of these conclusions and a number of findings of fact 
and evaluations of testimony that the Director made in 
support of his conclusions. 
"10974 
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FACTS 
1. Level of Supervisory Functions 
The USA and the District produced evidence in regard to 
each of the five indicia of supervisory responsibilities 
first articulated in East Ramapo CSD, 11 PERB 1f3075 (1978): 
1) observation and evaluation of teachers; 2) discipline; 3) 
grievances; 4) hiring of new employees; 5) curriculum. 
There are two types of department chairpersons in this 
District, so-called building chairpersons and District 
chairpersons. Some chairpersons are in charge of 
departments in the high school, others are in charge of 
departments in the junior high school and still others are 
in charge of departments covering more than one building. 
The building chairpersons are accountable to the building 
principal and the district chairpersons are accountable to 
the assistant superintendent of instruction, Allegra. The 
chairpersons perform some teaching duties, but a majority of 
their time is devoted to supervisory and department-related 
functions. 
As to observation and evaluation, the chairpersons are 
reguired to conduct a minimum of four observations and two 
evaluations per school year for nontenured teachers and two 
observations and one evaluation for tenured teachers. More 
can be conducted if the chairperson deems it necessary. 
Their observation reports become part of each teacher's 
10975 
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profile and are considered when the chairperson and building 
principal prepare their teacher evaluations or tenure 
recommendations. The chairperson must make recommendations 
concerning tenure. 
In regard to discipline, the chairpersons1 observations 
and evaluations become the basis for disciplinary action, if 
warranted. Their direct authority, however, is limited to 
the issuance of letters of reprimand, a form of discipline 
which does not require an Education Law §3020-a proceeding. 
In the event such proceeding is instituted, by decision of 
the superintendent, the chairpersons may testify against the 
teacher. 
There have been instances of grievances filed by the 
UTA against actions taken by the District in which the 
chairperson played a role. 
The chairpersons have input in the budgetary process 
and are expected to make recommendations regarding the need 
for additional staff or the excessing of staff. The 
chairpersons also have participated in interviewing 
applicants for new positions. The decision to hire, 
however, is made by the building principal or the 
superintendent. 
Finally, the chairpersons have been given a role in the 
development of curriculum for their respective departments. 
"10976 
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2. Subversion of Supervisory Responsibilities 
Three incidents were described in the testimony. 
Allegra testified to two incidents about which he concluded 
that a chairperson's judgment was influenced by his or her 
membership in the teacher unit. In one instance he stated 
that a chairperson refused to become involved in the process 
which resulted in a decision that a teacher's position 
should be eliminated due to a declining student/teacher 
ratio in the department. 
He also testified to an incident where a chairperson 
was unwilling to give an unsatisfactory rating to a 
probationary teacher when the others involved were of the 
opinion that such a rating should.be given. He concluded 
that the chairperson was motivated by the fact that the 
teacher was a unit member. 
A third incident was described by Nelson, a department 
chairperson, who testified to an incident where a UTA 
representative came to her after she had made a critical 
observation of a probationary teacher and sought to have her 
change her observation. She refused to do so and nothing 
further was done by the UTA. 
3. Inadequate Representation 
Based on the fact that negotiations over the 
chairpersons' differential was one of the last issues to be 
settled in 1977 and in 1980, the District urges that the 
"10977 
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chairpersons' negotiation interests have unduly delayed the 
negotiation process. On the other hand, the chairpersons' 
interests have been represented and negotiated at the 
bargaining table by the UTA. They have received two 
increases in their differential, as well as air conditioners 
and additional compensation for traveling between schools. 
Entire negotiation sessions have been devoted to department 
chairpersons' proposals. 
The USA asserts that "hostility" has arisen between the 
UTA and the chairpersons. The UTA amended its constitution 
to remove the voting rights of the chairpersons' 
representative on its executive board. The UTA replaced the 
) chairpersons' representative on the executive committee when 
he ceased to be. in the opinion of the UTA. a "member in 
good standing". The UTA considered that the chairpersons 
who organized the USA and discontinued dues checkoff were no 
longer "members in good standing". Certain privileges were 
thereafter denied to them. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the Director. 
In considering whether supervisory personnel should be 
removed from a long-standing unit, evidence relating to the 
level of supervisory functions, alleged subversion of 
supervisory responsibilities, and alleged inadequate 
i 
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representation, among other factors, is relevant.-
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Director 
has properly evaluated the evidence in regard to these 
factors. 
With regard to the level of supervisory functions of 
these department chairpersons, it may be noted that there 
are several levels of supervisors above them - assistant 
principal, principal, assistant superintendent, and 
superintendent. Many of these chairpersons perform their 
supervisory functions only in a single building. With 
respect to hiring, while these chairpersons are involved in 
the interview process and make recommendations, the ultimate 
decision rests with the building principal and 
superintendent. In the area of discipline, action of a 
nature harsher than a letter of reprimand can be initiated 
only by the building principal or the superintendent. Their 
role in curriculum and budget is limited to their respective 
departments. 
Whether we look at the roles of the chairpersons with 
respect to evaluations, discipline, grievances, hiring and 
curriculum separately or in concert, we agree with the 
Director's conclusion that they are mid-level supervisors. 
I/See County of Ulster, 16 PERB ir3069 (1983); Hyde 
Park CSD. 16 PERB 1f3083 (1983); East Ramapo CSD. supra. 
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Removal of mid-level supervisory personnel from a 
long-standing unit would not be warranted unless subversion 
of their supervisory responsibilities or inadequate 
representation or hostility by their union is demonstrated. 
Our review of the record compels us to agree with the 
Director that the testimony regarding alleged subversion of 
supervisory responsibilities is not sufficiently persuasive 
to warrant partition of the unit. The Director's evaluation 
of the testimony of Allegra and Nelson that the incidents of 
alleged subversion of supervisory responsibility were not of 
the level or degree warranting the removal from the unit, is 
supported by the record. 
We also find that the claim of inadequate representa-
tion is not supported by the record. There is no evidence 
of a failure to represent the chairpersons in 
2/ 
negotiations.- There is. on the contrary, evidence of 
considerable influence by the chairpersons in negotiations 
and in other activities of the UTA. Indeed, an effort by 
the UTA to reduce the influence of the chairpersons in the 
organization to one that is commensurate with their numbers 
became a source of conflict. Nevertheless, the chairpersons 
are still represented on the executive board (albeit in a 
nonvoting capacity) and are represented on the negotiating 
committee. The denial of membership privileges to 
—'Compare Hyde Park CSD, supra. 10980 
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chairpersons who organized the USA and discontinued dues 
check-off, standing alone, does not warrant granting the 
USA's request for a separate unit. 
Finally, we reject the District's contention that the 
chairpersons should be removed from the unit because the 
interests of chairpersons have unduly extended negotiations 
between the District and the UTA. First, the record does 
not support such a finding. Second, the contention is 
inconsistent with any claim of inadequate representation. 
Third, acceptance of the argument would place UTA in 
conflict with its obligation to represent adequately 
chairpersons by requiring it to refrain from "unduly" 
extending negotiations on their behalf. This would place 
any union in an untenable position. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the petition herein be, 
and it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: June 2. 1987 
Albany. New York 
' 'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Membe/ 
#2D-6/2/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
—and- CASE- NO-.—U~9007 
SYLVIA ZEDLAR. 
Charging Party. 
SYLVIA ZEDLAR, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Sylvia 
Zedlar (charging party) to the decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing, as deficient, her charge against the United 
Federation of Teachers. The Director's decision was 
delivered to the charging party by certified mail on 
April 12, 1987. Her exceptions were dated May 7. 1987 and 
were received on May 12. 1987. 
Section 204.10(c) of our Rules of Procedure requires 
exceptions to be filed within 15 working days after receipt 
of a decision by the Director dismissing a charge. Charging 
party has made no request for an extension of time to file 
exceptions. Charging party's exceptions are. therefore, 
untimely and cannot be considered. 
Board - U-9007 -2 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions of the 
charging party be, and they hereby are, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 2. 1987 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
\ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of Petition for Interest 
Arbitration filed by: 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY, 
Petitioner, 
=and=~ - CASE NO. M86-61 
SCHENECTADY PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
BUCHYN. O'HARE & WERNER. ESQS., Attorneys for 
City of Schenectady 
GRASSO & GRASSO, ESQS., Attorneys for Schenectady 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Pursuant to §209.4 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) and §§205.3-.9 of our Rules of Procedure, 
the City of Schenectady (City) filed a petition for compulsory 
interest arbitration of an impasse in collective negotiations 
between the City and the Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association (PBA). Section 205.5 of our Rules requires that a 
response to such petition be filed within 10 working days of 
the receipt of the petition. The PBA requested the Director 
of Conciliation (Director) to grant it an extension of time to 
file its response. The Director declined to grant such 
request. The matter comes to us on an "exception" filed by 
the PBA to the action of the Director. 
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In its papers, the PBA states that, prior to the filing 
of the City's petition for interest arbitration, the PBA had 
filed an improper practice charge against the City alleging 
that the City has refused to execute an agreement reached 
between the parties (Case U-9229). PBA asserts that it ought 
not be required to respond to the City's petition for 
arbitration until after a determination is made by the 
Administrative Law Judge on its improper practice charge. The 
PBA asserts that a response to the petition "will be totally 
inconsistent" with its position in the improper practice 
proceedings. PBA also argues that the award in the interest 
arbitration proceeding may be inconsistent with the decision 
reached in the improper practice proceeding. 
DISCUSSION 
Our Rules of Procedure contemplate that a party may raise 
objections to arbitrability by filing an improper practice 
charge within the time required to file a response to a 
petition for arbitration. Rule §205.5 states: 
If the respondent has filed an improper 
practice charge related to compulsory interest 
arbitration under section 205.6 of these Rules, 
the response shall contain a reference to such 
charge. 
There is, therefore, no basis in our Rules for permitting 
delay in filing a response merely because of the filing of an 
improper practice charge. No different result should follow 
because an improper practice charge is filed prior to the 
filing of the petition for interest arbitration. 
"10985 
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The improper practice charge filed by the PBA appears to 
raise a question as to the arbitrability of the dispute. Rule 
§205.6(c) states: 
The public arbitration panel shall not make 
any award on issues, the arbitrability of 
which is the subject for an improper practice 
eh-a£g-e--r---u-H-til---finai---de4:-exmi-n-a-tion:--th-eX"eo-<f---by-
the Board or withdrawal of the charge . . . . 
In view of that provision, we perceive no prejudice to the PBA 
in requiring it to file a timely response to the petition. 
Nothing in our Rules prevents the PBA from including in its 
response its position vis-a-vis the pendency of the improper 
practice charge. 
Accordingly. WE ORDER that the "exception" filed by PBA 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed. This proceeding should be 
processed by the Director in such manner as he deems advisable. 
DATED: June 2, 1987 
Albany, New York 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
E£^*>f<2^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
*>C/L****** s^2, 
Jerome Lefkowifcz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CAPITAL DISTRICT REGIONAL OFF-TRACK 
BETTING CORPORATION, 
Employer, 
and CASE NO. C-3090 
TEAMSTERS JOINT COUNCIL NO. 18, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
LOCAL 2055, COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, 
Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on the motion of the Capital District 
Regional Off-Track Betting Corporation that we reconsider the 
decision that we issued in this matter on April 24, 1987. 
The motion is denied. 
DATED: June 1, 1987 
Albany, New York 
lA*4lu- XS. 
Walter L. E i s enbe rg , Meijfber 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTH BABYLON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Upon- the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION 
CASE NO. E-1282 
The representative of the North Babylon Union Free School 
District Teachers Organization has requested permission, pursuant 
to §201.9(c)(3) of our Rules of Procedure, to appeal a ruling of 
the Administrative Law Judge made during the hearing in this 
matter denying a request for the issuance of a subpoena. 
The request of the North Babylon Teachers Organization is 
denied. The Administrative Law Judge's ruling may be considered 
in the event exceptions are filed to the Director's final 
decision in this proceeding. 
DATED: June 2. 1987 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 




Jerome Lefkowycz, Member jvt: 
U-«.f m 
#3A-6/2/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MANHATTAN AND BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT 
OPERATING AUTHORITY. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-3^ 198 
TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Transit Supervisors 
Organization has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Supervising Claim Examiners. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Transit Supervisors 
Organization. To negotiate collectively is the performance of 
their mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question rising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 2. 1987 
Albany, New York 
^ ^ £ / T A k s u s * - < 3 c ^ - ^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 




STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF ALDEN, 
Employer. 
-and- CASE- NO- C-3176 
VILLAGE OF ALDEN EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
VILLAGE OF ALDEN UNIT. LOCAL 815, CSEA. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
) CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Alden Employees' 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
) representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All employees of the Department of 
Public Works in the following titles: 
Working Crew Chief (Foreman), Senior 
Water/Sewer Plant Operator, Water Sewer 
Plant Operator. Motor Equipment 
Operator, and Laborer. 
Excluded-: Superintendent,.^clerical, CETA. 
part-time and seasonal employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Village of Alden Employees' 
Association. To negotiate collectively is the performance of 
their mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question rising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 2. 1987 
Albany, New York 
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